AARP Report Says More Older Americans Now Still Have Morgage Debt, Larger Mortgages, and So--Surprise--More Foreclosures

Not only is the foreclosure rate climbing for older mortgage holders, it is climbing faster than it is for younger ones.

 

The last blog described two very significant changes in home mortgages among older Americans in the period from 1989 to 2010: a much larger percentage of them have mortgages on their homes, and these mortgages are much larger. Now almost twice as many 65 to 74 year olds continue to have a mortgage to pay, and nearly three times as many 75+ year olds do so. And the median amount of mortgage debt has nearly tripled in this time period for 55 to 64 year olds, while the amount has increased about four and a half times for 65+ year olds. These are the results of a report released earlier this month from the AARP Public Policy Institute.

This report also showed that, although the foreclosure rate for older American mortgage holders is consistently less than for younger ones, the older mortgage holders’ foreclosure rate is climbing faster. Take a look at this data tabulated in the report:

Foreclosure Rates by Age	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	% Change 2007–2011
<50	0.42%	0.97%	1.84%	2.83%	3.48%	729%
50+	0.30%	0.66%	1.32%	2.27%	2.92%	873%

Notice that in every single year, the foreclosure rate was lower for those 50 years old or older than for those under 50. But also notice that the increase in the foreclosure rate was greater for the older Americans.

It makes sense that older homeowners would have a fewer foreclosures as a group. On average they’ve presumably owed their homes longer, bought them when prices were lower, and have had more time to pay down or pay off their mortgages. They would tend to have more income stability, and have had more time to accumulate savings and other resources with which to make mortgage payments if their income was reduced. And more of them would have sold their homes before the bubble burst when they cashed in their home equity for more modest homes.

As for why the foreclosure rate has increased more for older Americans, this flows directly from the two main conclusions of the last blog: because they are much more likely now to be carrying a mortgage at all, and because those mortgages are larger. Instead of no longer having a mortgage from having paid it off, or instead of owing a small balance in the final years of a mortgage with a modest payment, more are stuck with a sizeable obligation into the future.

So, older Americans are vulnerable month-to-month because of higher monthly mortgage obligations. And they are vulnerable long-term because they have less equity in their homes or none at all.  They are in the period of their lives when it’s more difficult to get hired or re-trained, when they are more likely to have health issues, and when they are on fixed incomes while expenses continue to rise. So it’s not surprising that more of the current AARP generation is ending up in foreclosure.

 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Putting "Profits Before People"?

Now that Fannie and Freddie are essentially owned by the taxpayers, why aren’t these institutions doing more to help homeowners? Particularly, why are they so adamantly against allowing mortgage principal reductions?

These are questions that ProPublica, “an independent, non-profit newsroom that produces investigative journalism in the public interest,” has been following and reporting on in a recent series of articles. I’m highlighting two of those articles in this blog.

Inherently Conflicting Purposes

“Why Fannie and Freddie Are Hesitating to Help Homeowners” describes “Fannie and Freddie's role in the housing market, and why it seems as if their actions often go against the interests of homeowners.” At the heart of it, these two institutions operate within a conflict about their core purpose: they were set up to make home ownership more accessible, but they are also supposed to make a profit. This first purpose would encourage Fannie and Freddie to be as flexible as possible to allow distressed homeowners to keep their homes. But the profit-making purpose would seem to run counter to letting homeowners too easily get out of their mortgage commitments.

Tax-Payer Takeover Only Complicated the Conflict

Now that taxpayers stand to gain or lose many billions of dollars depending on the profitability of Freddie and Fannie, that would seem to put more emphasis on profit-making and less on homeowner relief. On the other hand, providing significantly more help for distressed homeowners would arguably help stabilize home prices and improve the economy to everyone’s benefit.

As the ProPublica article states:

The two aims of Fannie and Freddie are continually at odds — policies encouraging refinancing and forgiveness for more mortgage holders can increase costs to the taxpayer-owned companies. While the administration has made relief for homeowners their priority, [Edward] DeMarco [the acting head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees Fannie and Freddie] says his agency's priority is to protect Fannie and Freddie's profits, aka taxpayers' assets. Of course, many of those taxpayers are struggling homeowners, and that is at the heart of the dilemma over Fannie and Freddie's future.

Mortgage Principal Reduction Caught between the Conflicting Purposes

A second ProPublica article addresses whether Fannie and Freddie will allow some homeowners to reduce their mortgage principal balances. That decision hangs in the political balance because of this same conflict between profitability and helping homeowners:

The Obama administration has repeatedly tried to push principal reduction — reducing the size of a borrower's mortgage — as a way to help homeowners, especially those with homes worth less than their mortgages. But... time and again, Fannie and Freddie wouldn't participate: a crippling problem, since the two companies own or guarantee about half of the country's mortgages.

[Edward] DeMarco [the interim head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), says principal reduction could cost taxpayers $100 billion. Some economists counter that while principal reductions might lead to a short-term hit for Fannie and Freddie, it would ultimately result in fewer underwater mortgages, fewer foreclosures and a healthier housing market — all good for Fannie and Freddie's bottom line.

To give DeMarco the last word, until my next blog:

DeMarco has... [told] Congress many times that "as conservator, FHFA has a statutory responsibility to preserve and conserve the enterprises' assets." In plainer terms, he [states] that his role is to "make sure Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac undertake activities that don't cause further losses for the American taxpayers."

DeMarco has strongly asserted his independence insisting that he is promoting needed fiscal discipline.